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监视社交媒体:关于支撑信息战的社交媒体分析的报告5/5
2017-11-15 标签:社交媒体 浏览次数:291 文本来源:蚁坊软件

第5章 几点建议

基于我们对面向信息战的社交媒体分析的相关文献的综述,以及对相关领域专家的访谈,我们为美国国防部如何更高效更有成效地建设和使用社交媒体分析能力以支持信息战提出了若干建议。这些建议涵盖了非技术问题(例如,法律和道德问题)、理论问题和实施中的体制问题,以及如何有效地分析社交媒体数据和建立技术能力的若干技术问题等。

制定国防部特定的社交媒体分析策略和语言

法律建议

国防部对于搜集和分析社交媒体数据有着合法的和紧迫的作战需求。一个关键挑战是为传统军事作战和基于第50条款的情报/隐蔽作战而制定的法律框架,这已经应用于美军的信息战。正如我们所详述的,这些法律框架解释的很糟糕,和本义有很大差距,意义模糊且不匹配。为使搜集和分析社交媒体数据符合美国法律要求,其中必要的第一步——同样也必须有效满足国家安全需求——是明确基于条款10的军事信息战和基于条款50、行政命令12333,以及外国情报监视法案指导下的对外情报监视行动的内涵区别。包括以下几方面的内容:

•在区分条款10和条款50的作战行动中,要首先弄清楚作战过程中的指挥权威和意图,而不是先研究作战方法和数据源。在情报机构领导的条款50的作战行动中,使用社交媒体数据鉴别关键网络节点从而以致命武力来瞄准,这与在MISO中使用相同的方法和数据源鉴别网络节点有着本质的不同。

•弄清楚在常规行动中“使用武力”和使用非动能的IRCs如MISO或公共事务等两者之间的区别。现行法律通过区分武装力量使用过程中的战斗人员和非战斗人员来体现美国的价值观,但是当它错误地表征时就会出问题,比如将旨在平息冲突的反宣传行动视为“武力使用”。

•要解决可能会用于信息战和IRCs的国内法律和政策间的层叠复杂的问题,同时阐述如何来区分美国法律和其他国家的适用法律。

•为政策和条文提供旨在保护美国人免于信息收集的明确的原则。区分两类作战行动:一类是针对美国国内民众的作战行动;另一种是作为现代通信系统和社交媒体的副产品而无意间收集了美国人数据的作战行动。

为社交媒体分析开发第10条款专属的语言

美国国防部一直在使用第50条款的语言和概念框架,并且使用诸如“搜集”和“滞留”等字眼强化了情报/隐蔽框架,和军事行动/信息战行动相冲突。为制定反映其需求的政策,国防部应该为社交媒体数据的获取、存储和分析等制订精确、特征鲜明的术语库,并将该术语库嵌入相关理论和政策备忘录中。举例说明,可以将“搜集”和“滞留”等术语去除,代之以“获取”和“存储”等标准词语。

道德的建议

除了确保信息战遵守法律,满足国家安全需要的、合理和可持续性的社交媒体分析能力还必须符合美国文化的道德标准。我们在道德考虑方面的建议包括过程选择、最佳实践建议,以及有关隐私控制的具体建议。

原则与法典

作为一个首要的过程建议,我们认为国防部应制定和发布灵活的行为准则,而不是一套硬性的规则。考虑到社交媒体技术和趋势飞速发展变化的特点,这尤为重要。这也会使得美国的军事指挥员以符合本土文化的方式实施道德行为,相比于基于硬性的规则可能得到的结果,这能在更大的程度上取得道德成果。

数据搜集的最佳做法

国防部应当制定一套基于标准的最佳做法,用于对反映美国价值观的社交媒体数据的收集,同时又不影响任务的完成。一套可行的做法应包括以下要素:

•如果可能的话,在保守谍报技术秘密和当前正在遂行任务秘密的前提下,使研究目标和方法公开化和明晰化。

•设计科学和明确的“比例”原则,以平衡信息的搜集侵扰和合理的国家安全需求的关系。

•采取合理的防护措施,以确保用于社交媒体数据集存储和发布的方法——即使是匿名者的信息——能保护人们避免被通过交叉引用或三角测量等方式识别身份。

•制定并发布相关的标准以衡量因信息收集产生的自由、开放使用社交媒体和互联网的行为对国家安全利益带来的风险。这一标准也应当包括对使用公共基金进行信息搜集的理由的评估标准。

•针对国防部对社交媒体数据的搜集,制订和发布一个关于个人隐私的合理期望的标准,以平衡国家安全需要和公众对信息透明度的期望。

实施和集成的若干建议

我们的分析致力于解决如何将社交媒体分析有效地集成到国防部的信息战中的问题,以及如何使用这些方法的途径。针对美国国防部部署使用社交媒体分析策略19,我们提出以下有关建议。

注释19:国防部应该从个人管理的角度认真考虑如何建设最优的分析能力。该报告没有针对是基于培训员工、还是租用政府雇员、抑或使用合同工来建设社交媒体分析力量,并对各种不同选择的优势和劣势等问题提出特别建议,但是这些问题依然存在,而且必须解决。

一个基于IRC的实现框架

面向信息战的大数据方法,包括社交媒体分析,都在发展的萌芽阶段。社交媒体概念、词汇和实践等方面的新特点阻碍了对它的采用和实施。将新信息和已知信息结合会帮助美国国防部更好吸纳这些新的方法和工具。为理解和使用社交媒体分析方法,将其作为信息战理论和实践的起点,第二章提出了一个基于IRC的初始框架。

一个企业级的社交媒体分析方法

目前国防部内部建设社交媒体分析能力的工作过于局限,没有和各个领域很好地协调。社交媒体分析方法正使用于解决作战指挥上和指挥层服务中存在的问题。这些各自为战的行动可能会在若干孵化点产生一些创新,但是由于缺乏一致,也会产生一些弊病:

•它排除了企业级行为能够节省开销的可能性。这对于数据获取的成本而言尤为重要,从国防部整体范围来协调技术获取和培训工作,也会节省开销。

•它增加烟囱的风险。

因此,我们建议国防部认真权衡建立一个企业级的社交媒体分析能力的利益和风险。

技术建议

技术获取

我们对社交媒体分析方法的评估审查更青睐现有的开源技术和方法。虽然我们承认商业部门的解决方案可能在技术上很成熟,且有较大的应用潜力,但是从成本和方案转化的适用性角度而言,也存在一些可能的缺陷。要推进社交媒体分析能力健康发展,国防部就必须综合权衡使用开源技术和商业化方案的利弊。特别需要考虑以下几个方面:

•商业供应商为保护即得利益,往往会将先进技术保密和私有,他们会趋向于提供“黑箱”解决方案,只给用户提供结果(不提供过程)。黑箱解决方案可能非常成熟,除非有企业内部人员能够看到内部的处理过程,包括内置的假设、各种权衡、代理设置等,否则结果的有效性是无法确认的。

•商业实体的获利策略可能不利于政府的利益。例如,对正在进展之中的合同进行谈判,以提供一些服务,这可能会导致公共基金的低效使用。与之形成比较的是,“授我以渔”的方法则将可用的工具和工作流放在了国防部系统分析员的手中。

•不是所有的技术或解决方案都要转化为国防部作战背景和现实。

培训和技能获取

目前美国国防部在网络空间专业的培训不能满足社交媒体分析能力的强烈需求。为了解决这一不足,我们提出了以下建议:

•考虑到国会需要指定针对社交媒体和公共可用信息的使用的专门的政策,有必要在国防部内部组织监督和合法合规的正式培训。

•根据国防部选择使用军职人员发展社交媒体分析力量的程度,培训就不能停留在“按键操作”的水平,要培训社交媒体分析人员如何理解社交媒体数据的含义。

针对国防部持续探索在发展和应用社交媒体分析能力中相关的因素,以及解决该过程中法律和政策的挑战这两个情况,表5.1为国防部提供了后续步骤的一个概述。

表5-1 使用社交媒体分析支援国防部信息战的路线图

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社交媒体分析正在广告和学术研究领域起着越来越重要的作用,但它在支持军事信息战方面仍有很大的潜力,它可以为了解特定网络群体的观点、想法以及交流方式等提供一扇窗口。虽然有迫切的国家安全需求,美国国防部也要在跨越美国法律和文化方面约束以及面临巨大的不确定性的情况下,发展社交媒体分析能力。美国现行法律和政策体系都没有预见到现代通信网络的快速发展和全球影响力,相关的具体实现及成本问题阻碍了强大的社交媒体分析能力的发展及最富有成效的分析应用。为了支持国防部在发展社交媒体分析能力时更好地评估相关利益、策略、挑战等,本报告评估了对于信息战最为有效的分析方法,以及相应的法律、伦理、政策、技术和培训等问题。该报告提出了一系列的建议,以帮助国防部在建设面向支持信息战的强大、高效的社交媒体分析能力时做出正确的决断。

原文链接: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1742.html    翻译人员:刘江宁 郭长国 王晓斌


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